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Abstract—Secure and reliable management of identities has 
become one of the greatest challenges facing cloud computing 
today, mainly due to the huge number of new cloud-based 
applications generated by this model, which means more user 
accounts, passwords, and personal information to provision, 
monitor, and secure. Currently, identity federation is the most 
useful solution to overcome the aforementioned issues and 
simplify the user experience by allowing efficient authentication 
mechanisms and use of identity information from data 
distributed across multiple domains. However, this approach 
creates considerable complexity in managing trust relationships 
for both the cloud service providers and their clients. Poor 
management of trust in federated identity management  systems 
brings with it many security, privacy and interoperability issues, 
which contributes to the reluctance of organizations to move their 
critical identity data to the cloud. In this paper, we aim to address 
these issues by introducing a novel trust and identity 
management model based on the Blockchain for cloud identity 
management with security and privacy improvements 
Keywords— Blockchain, cloud computing, security, identity 
management, trust management. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since cloud computing gains more and more importance, 
Identity management in and across clouds has become an area 
of great concern in this domain [1], [2]. According to Gartner 
[3], identity management is amongst the top three challenges 
that organizations face while moving their applications to a 
cloud-based model. Federated Identity Management (FIM) is 
the most used solution to overcome these issues; especially the 
cross-domain issues [2], [4], [5]. This approach simplifies the 
user experience by using cross-domain Single Sign-On features 
[5], and reduces the costs of administrating user accounts [4]. 
The federated exchange of user identity information between 
the separate security domains is based on standardized 
protocols, such as Security Assertion Markup Language, 
Shibboleth, WS-Federation, Liberty Alliance, OpenID and 
OAuth. All these frameworks usually follow a similar 
architectural concept [6], basically involving Identity Providers 
(IdP) and Service Providers (SP) in a structure called Circle of 
Trust, where IdPs and SPs have to trust each other; in 
particular, IdPs have to trust the SPs to securely handle a user’s 
identity data [3], whereas the SPs have to trust the IdPs to 
correctly authenticate users that want to access its services and 
protected resources [5]. While identity federation seems to be a 
promising approach for adopting identity management in cloud 
computing, the underlining trust model is poorly defined [3], 
[7], [8] and manually managed by pre-configured Trust Anchor 
Lists with a Public Key Infrastructure [9]. In this model, trust is 
established based on business agreements that must be set well 
before the interactions take place, which leads in forming 
closed and isolated communities [10]. Such a trust model is 
unsuitable for dynamic environments such as cloud computing, 
in which trust between parties involved in a federation process 
should be created dynamically on demand instead of being 
statically defined and manually managed by a central authority. 
Researches generally believe that decentralised and dynamic 
management of trust is vital for ensuring safe, secure and 
transparent use of user’s sensitive data and cloud services [2], 
[10]. In addition, identity federation carries significant security 
and tracking risks [11], and does not have a good approach to 
protect user’s privacy [12]. The sharing of users’ identity 
attributes among different entities involves the collection of 
user data without user consent [2], [12]. Many studies show 
that the personal data collected can be misused by malicious 
SPs and IdPs [2], or compromised [12], or otherwise 
improperly disclosed [11], [12], which could lead to a higher 
level of information leakage [2], [12], [11]. These issues will 
become even more complicated with cloud computing [2] since 
it is a highly dynamic, multi-tenancy, insecure, and open 
environment. The aforementioned drawbacks of FIM constitute 
the main obstacle to the successful adoption of this approach in 
cloud computing and emphasize the need for a new cloud 
identity management scheme with improved security and 
privacy. Motivated from the above, we aim to address these 
challenges by proposing in this paper a distributed trust and 
identity model that relies on the Blockchain.  The proposed 
trust model allows the cloud service providers (CSPs) to 
autonomously manage their trust relationships in a dynamic 
and distributed manner without the need for centralized 
authorities, such as the IdPs. This makes cloud service 
provisioning and user interaction easier, more secure, and more 
flexible. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents basic concepts related to Blockchains for identity 
management. Section III discusses some related works and 
their limitations. In section IV we introduce our trust model. 
Section V introduces an application example. Finally, section 
VI reviews the content of the paper, presents the conclusions 
and outlines our future work. 
This work was supported by CYBER-TRUST project, which has received 
funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme under grant agreement no. 786698. 
II. BLOCKCHAIN FOR CLOUD IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
In recent years, blockchain technology has attracted a lot of 
attention from Internet users, researchers and stakeholders 
across a wide range of sectors like finance [13], healthcare [14], 
logistics and transportation [15], defense and the government 
sector [16]. First used as a public ledger for the Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency [17], blockchain is regarded as a distributed, 
fault-tolerant and trusted data structure that is replicated and 
shared among the members of a peer-to-peer network [18]. The 
database is made of a linear sequence of chained blocks; each 
one represents a single data unit, typically made of a header of 
metadata, a record of transactions and the cryptographic hashes 
corresponding to the previous and current block to ensure 
continuity and immutability [18]. New blocks are added at the 
end of the chain. A simplified representation of a blockchain 
architecture is given in Figure 1.  
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Fig. 1. Blockchain architecture. 
The transparent, distributed and trusted nature of the 
blockchain enables the development of a non-refutable and 
unforgeable ledger of data [19], which is the key feature of a 
many successful applications, such as identity management. 
Combining this new technology of trust with cloud identity 
management can offer considerable advantages compared to 
FIM approach, and solve some, if not all, problems mentioned 
above. The works carried out in [19], [20] and [21] show that 
the blockchain provides a promising opportunity to standardize 
and strengthen identity management processes. It can 
potentially assist in improving transparency and security in 
cloud identity management [22].  In fact, the use of public 
blockchains renders it difficult to compromise the integrity of 
their records without being noticed by the entire network [23]. 
In addition, the use of distributed (and in many cases fault-
tolerant) consensus protocols allows preventing malicious 
activities, like double-spending, hacking [23], and mitigating 
identity theft and fraud [22]. Moreover, removing 
intermediaries (e.g. central authorities), by using the 
blockchain, has the potential to reduce the costs, time, and 
complexity of cloud identity management [19], [20]. All these 
characteristics demonstrate that blockchain technology seems 
to be the perfect match for cloud identity management needs. 
III. RELATED WORKS 
In last few years, numerous works have emerged for 
adapting blockchain technology in order to meet new identity 
management requirements. In this context, the authors in [21] 
proposed a decentralized personal data management platform 
by combining blockchain technology with an off-blockchain 
storage solution. The proposed framework focuses on user’s 
privacy issues on mobile platforms (social networks and big 
data), where service providers collect users’ sensitive data 
without their knowledge or control. This work shows the 
advantages of blockchain technology in enhancing user privacy 
in the context of social networks and big data.  
Towards the same direction, a new blockchain-based 
authentication and trust management model, called BATM, 
was proposed in [24]. The BATM blockchain is used as a 
distributed database to store authentication public keys, digital 
signatures and information about peers. The proposed 
framework helps to ensure validity and integrity of 
cryptographic authentication data and associate a peer trust 
level in the area of decentralized ad-hoc networks. Another 
application of blockchain in identity management was 
proposed in [25], where a new public and decentralized 
authentication scheme, named Certcoin, was presented. The 
Certcoin blockchain is built on top of Namecoin [26] which is a 
cryptocurrency designed to act as a secure decentralized 
namespace (DNS). Certcoin provides a decentralized public 
key infrastructure in order to maintain a public ledger of the 
domains and their associated public keys. This solution helps to 
mitigate many of the issues in current PKIs, such as the need 
for a trusted third party and the lack of efficient key retrieval 
mechanisms. As trust is a vital component of identity 
management, TrustChain [27] is another use of the blockchain 
technology in this area, with a focus on building trust among 
users (individuals or organizations) with no prior trust 
relationship. It is a distributed trust management solution that 
helps in determining trustworthiness of agents in an online 
community. TrustChain provides a new scalable and Sybil 
attack resistant blockchain solution. 
These schemes presented above demonstrate the use of 
blockchain for identity management and its potential to 
enhance security and privacy compared to traditional 
approaches. However, each scheme is specifically designed for 
a specific area. To our knowledge, the use of a blockchain for 
identity management in cloud environment has never been fully 
explored. In this work, we aim to integrate blockchain in the 
cloud identity management by proposing a simple and fully 
decentralized blockchain-based trust and identity management 
solution. The details of the proposed system are provided in the 
following sections. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. System architecture 
First, we begin with an overview of the architecture of our 
system. As shown in Figure 2, the three critical entities 
involved in the proposed solution are cloud users, Cloud 
Service Providers (CSP) and the Trust Management Platform 
(TMP), whose roles are explained below.  
1) Cloud user: is the entity that wants to access services 
and protected resources from different CSPs in the TMP. The 
user is registered in one or more CSPs in the TMP, called 
home CSP. Unregistered users in the TMP will have to go 
through a registration phase to obtain their digital identities. 
2) Cloud service provider: The CSP offers various cloud 
services and resources to cloud users and requires proper 
identification and authentication. The user’s home CSP is the 
CSP responsible for authenticating the user. It is assumed that 
this CSP is ultimately trusted by the user.  
3) Trust management platform: The TMP incorporates 
the Blockchain network, which consists of a number of 
participating CSPs. All authentication transaction records will 
be recorded in the form of blocks and be verified by the 
blockchain nodes (i.e. the CSPs). The TMP is dynamically 
extensible and a new CSP can join it automatically in runtime. 
That allows rapid and seamless interactions between multiple 
unknown CSPs without the need for preconfigured trust 
relationships. This leads to increase significantly the 
scalability and flexibility needed for the cloud identity 
management. 
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Fig. 2. Architectural overview. 
The core idea of our system is illustrated in Figure 2. It 
mainly involves the following steps: First, the user wants to 
access protected resources and services of a CSP in the TMP 
with which he is not registered with (step 1); such CSPs will be 
called foreign CSPs. In this case, the foreign CSP redirects the 
user to the home CSP in order to perform authentication. Then 
(steps 2, 3), the home CSP validates the authentication request 
and creates an access token that contains claims about the 
identity and privileges associated with the user’s account.  
The token is stored in the blockchain, in order to prove that 
this is a valid token owned by the user and issued by a trusted 
CSP in the TMP, thus significantly increasing the security and 
level of the exchange. Once the token is validated and stored in 
the blockchain (step 4), the CSP will continue with the 
transaction and allow the user to access protected resources 
based on the specified access privileges (step 5); otherwise, the 
CSP will stop the transaction and deny access to the protected 
resources. 
B. Blockchain architecture 
As mentioned before, in the proposed framework, the 
blockchain is considered as a decentralized trust model that 
allows CSPs managing their trust relationships in a distributed 
manner without relying on a trusted third-party (i.e. the IdPs), 
while it is also used as a public shared ledger that stores all the 
transactions among the interacting CSPs. The transactions are 
used to create and store the tokens that authenticate users to 
foreign CSPs and guarantee their access to protected resources. 
An access token TKN contains claims about the identity and 
privileges associated with a user account u, defined by the 
creator Hcsp of the token (i.e. the home CSP) and sent to the 
recipient Fcsp (the foreign CSP); the protected resources res, for 
which access is requested by the user, are identified by their 
address Addr(res). Each token corresponds at most to one 
transaction TX, whose structure is represented as follows 
TX = (TXID || Nin || Vin[] || Nout || Vout[]) 
where TXID is the identifier of the transaction, Nin and Nout 
hold the number of transaction inputs and outputs, whereas Vin 
and Vout are the input and output vectors. Each input in Vin has 
the following components: the index idx of the input in Vin, the 
reference to previous input refin, the encrypted user information 
Enc(U), and the address Addr(res) of the requested resource. 
Likewise, each output in Vout has the following components: 
the index idx of the output in Vout, the reference to the previous 
output refout, the created token TKN, and the address Addr(Fcsp) 
of the recipient CSP (Fcsp). To store the tokens in a 
chronological order, transactions are linked to each other by 
including a hash of the previous transaction into a field of the 
current transaction. Identification of the CSPs in the TMP and 
the authenticity of the tokens are guaranteed by digital keys, 
signatures and addresses. Each CSP is associated with a pair 
keys (prvcsp, pubcsp), where prvcsp denotes the private key and 
pubcsp denotes the public key. The private key prvcsp is used to 
create signature called sig that is required to sign the 
transaction and prove the authenticity of the token. The Hcsp 
encrypts the user information, which limits access to the user’s 
identity only to the key holder. Keys are derived in a tree 
structure, so that a parent key can derive a sequence of children 
keys and implemented by using the Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with secp256k1 curve [28].  
C. Consensus protocol 
The validation of transactions is performed by the CSPs in 
the network, who are responsible for maintaining the ledger’s 
integrity as well. The transactions (carrying the tokens) are not 
immediately added to the blockchain; instead, they are packed 
into blocks containing many transactions for efficiency reasons. 
This allows to avoid flooding the network with each generated 
block, and to minimize the time spent on block generation. The 
algorithms that are typically used by the peers to validate the 
authenticity of transactions are called consensus protocols. 
There have been many proposals in this area (see e.g. [18] and 
the references therein for an overview), but our approach relies 
a Proof of Stake (PoS) solution.  
In the proposed solution, each new transaction is broadcast 
to all network peers (i.e. the CSPs) and a new block is 
generated from the CSP that is eligible to do so. The eligibility 
and other aspects of the PoS protocol are defined by the 
following high-level functions: 
1) CheckEligibility(hblk, d, keycsp, stakecsp). The function 
is used to elect a leader for generating the next block in the 
chain by checking if a CSP is eligible. Its input arguments are 
the last block header hblk, a target value d, the account key 
keycsp, (different from the public/private key pair used in other 
operations) and the stake or the assets stakecsp owned by the 
CSP; it returns a Boolean value (true or false). 
2) GenerateBlock(blk, d). The function is used for 
generating the block to store on the blockchain. Its input 
arguments are the transactions block blk and a target value d; it 
returns a pair ⟨prf, sig⟩ of values, where prf is a proof-of-
eligibility (that other CSPs can verify) and sig is the digital 
signature of the block. These values are obtained as follows 
prf = Hash(pubcsp || prfold) 
sig = Sign(prvcsp, hblk) 
where pubcsp and prvcsp are the public and private key of the 
CSP generating the new block, while prfold is the last proof-of-
eligibility (like Nxt’s PoS protocol). The function returns 
empty when CheckEligibility indicates that the CSP is not 
eligible. 
3) ValidateBlock(blk, d, prf). The function is used for 
verifying a block having been stored on the blockchain. It 
returns true only if CheckEligibility is true and blk (the 
signature of the block), prf (the proof) are both valid. 
4) Resolve(fork1, ..., forkn). The function is utilized for 
resolving possible cases where multiple forks are present by 
returning a unique fork, say forkl, to work with. This situation 
occurs when many CSPs are simultaneously eligible for 
generating the next block. 
The system-wide target value d that has been used in the 
above functions controls the block generation time (by 
adjusting the difficulty of the problem that a CSP has to solve), 
which in our application scenario is envisaged to be 30 
seconds. The difficulty of the problem to be solved by each 
CSP also depends on the time timecsp elapsed since the last 
block generated by the particular CSP, its stake stakecsp, as well 
as its trust value tcsp in the TMP. The latter also gives incentives 
to the CSPs to adhere to the specified protocol; the expression 
dcsp = d · timecsp · stakecsp · tcsp 
provides a simple way to define a CSP-specific difficulty level 
for the PoS protocol designed for cloud identity management. 
Then, the eligibility of a CSP for being a leader is decided by 
checking whether the condition Prefix(prf, k) < dcsp holds for a 
system-wide parameter k (e.g. 64 or 128). 
D. Trust model 
In order to ensure effective and more secure interactions 
among the participating CSPs in the TMP, transactions stored 
in the blockchain are used to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
each CSP over time based on their behavior. In the TMP, each 
CSP has two kinds of roles: home CSP (Fcsp) and foreign CSP 
(Fcsp). A home CSP provides authentication services of 
registered users (u) to another CSP in the TMP, while, a foreign 
CSP grants access to protected resources to registered users 
with another CSP in the TMP. In order to calculate the 
trustworthiness of each CSP, we define Trustn,t(CSP) to be the 
trust level of the CSP up to n transactions in the time interval t. 
It is in the range 10 Trust  and depends on the features that 
are presented in table 1. 
1) User credibility: we use Credn,t(u) to denote the 
credibility value that CSPs in the TMP give to the user up to n 
transactions in the time interval t. It is defined as follows 
TABLE I.  FEATURES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Trust feature Description 
Credibility 
(Cred) 
It refers to the users credibility according to the 
behavior exhibited in transactions made with other 
CSPs in the TMP. This feature helps to identify 
malicious users and users’ ability in delivering truthful 
feedback about the quality of the CSPs that provided 
services. Feedbacks provided by users with higher 
credibility are more trustful than those from users with 
lower credibility. 
Authentication 
(Auth) 
It refers to the ability of Hcsp in fulfilling authentication 
requirements by registers and authenticates users safely 
and securely. It is derived from the past behavior of the 
Hcsp registered users reported by other CSPs in the 
TMP. 
Satisfaction 
(SAT) 
It refers to the degree of the satisfaction that the CSPs 
in the TMP have about a given Fcsp based on its 
services quality. It keeps a record of the satisfaction 
degree for all the transactions that a Fcsp makes with the 
other CSPs. 
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    Where, Credn,t (Fcsp, u) represents the credibility value that 
Fcsp gives to the user up to n transactions in the time interval t; 
the initial value is set to one (Cred0,0 (Fcsp, u) = 1) and the 
credibility update function is defined in equation (2). 
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2) Authentication: we use Authn,t (Hcsp) to denote the 
authentication level of the Hcsp given by the other CSPs based 
on its authentication services up to n transactions in the time 
interval t. It keeps a record of the authentication level of all the 
transactions a Hcsp makes with other CSPs participating in the 
TMP. It is computed as follows 
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      Where Authn,t (Fcsp, Hcsp) represents the authentication level 
the Fcsp gives to the Hcsp based on its authentication service up 
to n transactions in the time interval t. Its initial value is equal 
to Auth0,0(Fcsp, Hcsp) = 0. The authentication update function is 
defined as follows 
).4(          
2
),(
),(
,1
,
cspcsptncurr
cspcsptn
HFAthenAuth
HFAuth

  
   Where, Authcurr represents the authentication level for the 
current transaction. It is derived from the feedback provided 
by the FCSP to the user of the Hcsp in the transaction based on its 
behavior. It is defined as follows  
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3) Satisfaction: we use SATn,t (Fcsp) to denote the degree 
of satisfaction that other CSPs have upon the Fcsp based on its 
quality of services up to n transactions in the time interval t. It 
is computed by applying the calculation rule in equation (4). 
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    Where, SATn,t(Hcsp, Fcsp) represents the degree of satisfaction 
that Hcsp has upon the Fcsp based on its quality of service up to n 
transactions in the time interval t , and k is the number of CSPs 
in the TMP; its initial value is SAT0,0 (Hcsp, Fcsp) = 0. The 
satisfaction update function is defined in equation (5).. 
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    Where, SATcurr is the satisfaction value for the current 
transaction. The value of SATcurr is computed based on a 
feedback system, where the user u from the Hcsp rates the 
quality of service offered by Fcsp after each transaction 
according to the following rule 
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The overall trust level Trustn,t (CSP) of a CSP in the TMP up 
to n transactions in the time interval t is defined as follows: 
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     Where ω1, ω2 are the weights given to the satisfaction and 
authentication features respectively. These parameters express 
the degree of influence of each feature on the overall trust 
value. They are defined by the k CSPs participating in TMP on 
the interval [0, 1], according to their trust requirements 
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V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE: IAAS CLOUD FEDERATION 
 (CLOUD OF CLOUDS) 
In this section, we present an application example in order to 
illustrate the feasibility of the proposed model. The particular 
application example focuses on the Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) cloud federation [29], which is a partnership between 
different CSPs for the borrowing/lending of virtual resources 
including VMs, virtual clusters and virtual networks. This new 
perspective of cloud computing can be especially very useful to 
groups of small and medium cloud providers wanting to 
consolidate their limited resources to increase the quality of 
service, cost benefits, and reliability [30]. Current studies 
affirm that the promises of infinite computing power and 
infinite storage at cost which are extremely low can only be 
achieved by federations at the IaaS level [29], [30], [31]. 
Despite these promises, IaaS cloud federation is not yet mature 
because of many obstacles especially related to interoperability, 
security and trust management [30], [31]. Identity management 
represents the first challenge to be solved, in order to perform 
the authentication among heterogeneous CSPs establishing a 
federation [31]. The existing solutions use federated identity 
technologies to manage authentication and authorization across 
the whole cloud federation. However, as we said before, 
existing federation models are designed for static environments 
where a priori business agreements are needed among the 
parties and bring many security, privacy and interoperability 
issues. The proposed trust model is an effective method to 
address the aforementioned obstacles and facilitate the creation 
of secure IaaS cloud federations.  
CSP4
Cloud Consumer
(Home CSP)
CSP1
Cloud Provider 
(Foreign CSP)
1- Request  to rent virtual resource
2- Access Token request
4- Providing the requested resource
3- Create 
transaction
(Access Token)
IaaS cloud federation (TMP)
Regular cloud usersRegular cloud users
CSP 4
CSP 5
CSP n
CSP 7
CSP1
CSP 3
CSP 6
CSP 2
Blockchain network
...
 
Fig. 3. Authentication scenario in order to share virtual resources. 
In IaaS cloud federations, individual CSP provides and 
consumes virtual resources to and from other federation 
members. In this case, users can be either CSPs in the 
federation who share virtual resources from one another or 
regular cloud users. The home CSPs are responsible for 
authenticating their registered regular users and themselves 
when they share virtual resources from other CSPs in the 
federation, and foreign CSPs provide virtual resources to other 
CSPs in the federation or to regular users. Trust relationships 
between the participating CSPs in the IaaS federation are 
managed by the TMP, which incorporates the blockchain 
network and the proposed trust model. As designed, the TMP is 
automatically extensible, which allows other CSPs to join the 
IaaS federation in a dynamic way. 
Figure 3 illustrates the authentication scenario when a CSP 
share virtual resources from another CSP in the federation. The 
home CSP creates an access token and sends the transaction to 
the blockchain network. After validating and storing the token 
in the blockchain, the foreign CSP provides the requested 
virtual resource to the home CSP. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
This paper presents a new application of the blockchain in 
the context of cloud identity management. The proposed model 
provides an authentication mechanism as well as a 
decentralized trust model based on the blockchain. With this 
trust model, CSPs do not require pre-configured trust 
relationships to interact, whilst trust can change dynamically 
according to the entities behavior. This approach presents an 
effective identity management solution for facilitating the 
creation of secure IaaS cloud federations. It also can be applied 
to a number of different use cases in distributed and open 
environments. As a future work, we expect to apply the 
proposed model in a real cloud environment in order to carry 
out tests and experiments. Moreover, we intend to conduct in-
depth investigation on how to provide more desired properties, 
pertaining to security and usability [32]. We will rely on the 
Hyperledger Fabric project for implementing and testing the 
proposed blockchain based solution. 
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